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INTRODUCTION
In their magisterial treatment of the shape and significance of causal
questions in the law, H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honord wrote that "the narrative of
history is scarcely ever a narrative of brute sequence, but is an account of the
roles played by certain factors and especially by human agents."1 This is so
because "[h]istory is written to satisfy not only the need for explanation, but
also the desire to identify and assess contributions made by historical figures to
changes of importance; to triumphs and disasters, and to human happiness or
suffering."2 Like historians, judges and others who articulate and apply legal
doctrine must identify and assess how actors' contributions may change
circumstances. Although the relationships between causal inquiry and ultimate
legal responsibility are complex, questions of causation are usually inescapable
if not dispositive for the normative attributions that underlie legal outcomes.3
From the standpoint of causal inquiry, the liability for breach of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty and the remedies available to one wronged by a
fiduciary's breach are distinctive. This point buttresses Professor Frankel's
* David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to Jacob
Johnson (Duke, J.D. Candidate 2012) for excellent research assistance and to the
participants in the conference, The Role of Fiduciary Law and Trust in the Twenty-First
Century, for their comments and reactions to my thesis. I also thank Professor Tamar
Frankel, who has long been a steadfast source of inspiration and encouragement.
I H.L.A. HART & TONY HONOR, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 63 (2d ed. 1985).
2 Id.
3 Id. at xxxv ("That we are responsible for the harm we cause is a principle that makes an
immediate appeal to common moral sensibility.").
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central claim that fiduciary law encompasses a distinctive set of actors who
furnish services to others and who are subject to a distinctive body of law that
also embodies a distinctive remedial regime.4 Substantively, "fiduciary law" is
distinctive because it imposes a duty of loyalty that "supports the main purpose
of fiduciary law: to prohibit fiduciaries from misappropriating or misusing
entrusted property or power."' 5 Likewise, when a fiduciary breaches the duty
of loyalty, a distinctive remedy is available to the beneficiary - disgorgement
of the benefit that the fiduciary obtained through the breach. 6
But there are additional dimensions, both of liability for breach of a duty of
loyalty and the available remedies, that complement this account and warrant
closer examination. For starters, it is long-established law that a beneficiary
who suffers an injury as a consequence of a fiduciary's disloyal act may
recover quantifiable losses from the fiduciary. 7 That a disloyal fiduciary is
subject to liability for harm inflicted on the beneficiary as a consequence of the
breach parallels the basic remedial consequence of tort law and may help
explain why, in the United States, breach of fiduciary duty is defined as a tort.8
The remedial consequences of disloyalty also call into question how tight the
causal link must be between a fiduciary's breach and the beneficiary's loss, as
well as the demands of tort law's foundational requirement of but-for
causation.
Additionally, a distinctive variety of dualism permeates both the substance
of fiduciary liability and the available remedies. That is, a disloyal fiduciary,
subject to liability for harm caused to the beneficiary, must also disgorge
benefits obtained or derived from the disloyal conduct. Each side of fiduciary
liability - one stemming from the law of restitution, the other closely
4 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 240 (2011).
5 Id. at 108.
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43(1)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005); E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain?: The Dilemma
of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1355 (1985).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) ("One standing in a fiduciary relation
with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty
imposed by the relation."). Not all states characterize breach of fiduciary duty as an
independent tort. See, e.g., Kinzer v. City of Chicago, 539 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (Ill. 1989)
(finding that breach of fiduciary duty is controlled by substantive law of agency, contract,
and equity).
8 Other common law jurisdictions do not situate breach of fiduciary duty within the
taxonomy of tort law, as does the United States. For a discussion of the distinctions
between tort law and fiduciary duty based on the law of the United Kingdom and the
Commonwealth, see MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY 229-35 (2010). A question
beyond the scope of this Article is the overall severity and significance of difference
between U.S. law and that of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth jurisdictions. On
related questions in connection with trusts in non-common law systems, see COMMERCIAL
TRUSTS IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Michele Grazadei, Ugo Mattei & Lionel Smith eds.,
2005).
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associated with tort law - is conceptually distinct, with but-for causation much
more prominent when the beneficiary seeks compensation for loss. Indeed,
some courts treat but-for causation as an essential element of a beneficiary's
claim against a disloyal fiduciary when the beneficiary seeks to recover
compensatory damages for losses caused by the fiduciary's wrongdoing.
However, when the beneficiary seeks disgorgement of the fiduciary's illicit
gains, the absence of but-for causation does not necessarily exonerate the
fiduciary. 9 Put differently, but-for causation is not dispositive of restitutionary
liability.
Each side of fiduciary liability also uses a distinctive vocabulary. Within
restitution, a disloyal fiduciary "obtains" or "derives" benefits through
wrongful conduct,' 0 terms that hint at causal connections but do not explicitly
articulate them. So foreign might the vocabulary of causation seem to
disgorgement that, in the assessment of a leading scholar of contract law, the
courts ordering the remedy are "oblivious to the question of cause in fact,"11
and pay "little regard to questions of cause in fact."'12 In fact, as this Article
elaborates, causal concepts are germane to disgorgement. Implicit in some
respects in the beneficiary's prima facie case, doctrines derived from these
causal concepts connect recoverable gains to the fiduciary's wrongful conduct.
Additionally, causal inquiry is essential to liability for assisting a fiduciary's
disloyal conduct. Not only must the defendant have known of the disloyalty,
the defendant must also have participated in the fiduciary's disloyal act by
furthering it in a specific way.13
9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51, cmt. e(1)
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). As the Comment observes:
To take an obvious example, a trustee who makes a profit from the personal use of trust
assets could not escape liability in restitution by proving that he could have (and would
have) made the same profit legitimately, if only his access to the trust assets had been
hindered in some way.
Id. Additionally, if the trustee takes the trust assets and invests them on his own account,
many factors "independent of the wrong" will contribute to the success or failure of the
investment, including market conditions and the trustee's investment acumen. Id.
Restitutionary liability embodies a causal presumption that, but for the breach, the trustee
would not have realized the profit as well as "an implicit judgment that the claimant, rather
than the wrongdoer, should . . . obtain the benefit of the favorable market conditions,
acumen, or luck, as the case may be." Id.
10 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43(1), (2)(a)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
" Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 1362.
12 Id. at 1359. Causal and other issues that delimit recovery in restitution may also have
been slighted by authorities in the Anglo-Commonwealth tradition. See Peter Devonshire,
Account of Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 32 SYDNEY L. REv. 389, 402 (2010)
("Overall it seems that the role of limiting principles in defining the scope of an account of
profits has received less analytical attention than the corresponding rules for
compensation.").
13 See, e.g., BBS Norwalk One, Inc. v. Raccolta, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (S.D.N.Y.
2011]
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The bite of but-for causation is troubling when a beneficiary claims that a
fiduciary's disloyalty biased or compromised the fiduciary's performance of
functions or duties, resulting in harm to the beneficiary. We might be
concerned that the fiduciary's disloyalty inflicted loss on the beneficiary by
warping how the fiduciary performed, depriving the beneficiary of the value of
loyal performance but doing so in a manner that is difficult to prove. As it
happens, jurisdictions in the United States do not use the same standard to
shape the causal inquiry in such cases. In some, the causal question is whether
the fiduciary's breach of duty was a "substantial factor" in the complex of
causative factors leading to the loss to the beneficiary. Other jurisdictions, in
contrast, require a beneficiary who seeks compensation for loss from a disloyal
fiduciary to establish that, but for the breach, the loss would not have occurred.
Part I begins by examining the basic nature of causal inquiry when a
beneficiary seeks disgorgement of gains realized by the fiduciary through a
breach of loyalty, including the limits of the fiduciary's liability. Consistent
with Professor Frankel's central claim, the same causal questions arise across
instances of disloyalty by different types of actors in fiduciary roles, including
agents, trustees, lawyers, and financial advisers. Beyond the basics, Part I.B
engages the more controverted question of defining circumstances in which the
causal connection between disloyalty and the fiduciary's gain comes to an end,
either because an independent cause intervened or the causal force of the
disloyalty otherwise ran out. Part II focuses on causal questions when a
beneficiary seeks a compensatory remedy for losses suffered due to a
fiduciary's disloyalty. After surveying competing approaches to but-for-
causation, this Part argues that tests of causation in this context should not bite
so sharply that the underlying objectives of fiduciary accountability are
undermined. Part III expands the theoretical frame of reference by situating
causal questions prompted by the breach of fiduciary duty adjacent to related
questions in torts, focusing in particular on similarities and distinctions
between fraud and fiduciary disloyalty. The Article concludes by circling back
to Hart and Honor6. The causal questions that are explicitly or implicitly
triggered by breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty are not answered by
narratives of brute sequence because these questions necessarily involve
assessing a fiduciary's ultimate responsibility for consequences. The nature of
a fiduciary's undertaking of loyal service should shape how the law assesses
causation.
1999); Wirum & Cash, Architects v. Cash, 837 P.2d 692, 713 (Alaska 1992) ("A person
who knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust is himself guilty of
tortious conduct and is subject to liability for the harm thereby caused." (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874, cmt. c (1979))); see also Richard C. Mason, Civil
Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 Bus. LAW. 1135, 1159-64 (2006) (discussing the
elements of a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty).
[Vol. 91: 851
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I. BENEFITS OBTAINED IN BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. The Basic Principle
Disgorgement of ill-gotten gain is well-established as a remedial
consequence when a fiduciary obtains a benefit in breach of a duty of loyalty.
14
Likewise, as formulated in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution, a third party
must account to the beneficiary of the duty for benefits the third party obtains
"in consequence of' the fiduciary's breach. 15 In many cases that illustrate this
principle in application, the causal link between the fiduciary's breach and the
benefit in question is straightforward because the fiduciary obtained the benefit
by misappropriating either the beneficiary's property or an asset to which the
beneficiary is entitled, often because the fiduciary has control over the
beneficiary's assets as a trustee or otherwise.16 However, the remedy is also
available when a fiduciary - such as an agent - who does not control property
of the principal nonetheless acquires a benefit without the principal's consent
by using the fiduciary's position, often in connection with transactions
conducted on behalf of the principal. 17 Side-benefits to an agent often stem
from payments or other benefits furnished by third parties with whom the
agent deals on the principal's behalf. When the principal purchases from a
third party through the agent, such extractions are likely to raise the cost of the
transaction for the principal, or, correspondingly, to reduce the benefit realized
by the principal when the principal sells to the third party through the agent.' 8
Additionally, an agent's disgorgement mandate extends to benefits that are
not so directly derived at the principal's expense and to circumstances in which
the agent's disloyal conduct may not directly inflict loss on the principal. For
example, in Phansalkar v. Anderson Weinroth & Co.,19 a banker employed as a
deal adviser and facilitator by an investment bank accepted investment
opportunities (including stock options) for his own account from clients with
whom he worked on transactions on the bank's account, doing so without his
employer's consent or knowledge. 20 The court, finding that the banker thereby
breached his duty of loyalty, held him liable to his employer for profits he
14 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43(1)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
15 Id.
16 Id. § 43(1) cmt. c, illus. 3-6.
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (2006).
18 See, e.g., Condon Auto Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Crick, 604 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Iowa 1999)
(observing that the general manager of used car lot personally received $700 for purchasing
used cars from a seller, corresponding with a decline in the lot's profit margins); Hadden v.
Consol. Edison Co., 382 N.E.2d 1136, 1138 (N.Y. 1978) (describing how the corporation's
vice president received bribes and secret cash "gifts" from construction firms with which the
corporation did business).
19 344 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2003).
20 Id. at 203.
20111
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made or property he obtained, such as shares of stock via the exercise of stock
options received from his employer's clients.2' The investment opportunities
stemmed directly from the banker's performance of work for his employer's
clients, which groups the benefits with other compensation due the employer
for its services.22 Moreover, as the firm's representative, the banker acted as
an adviser on his employer's behalf with consequences that might prove
disadvantageous for the firm; by not informing his employer of the side-
benefits, the banker deprived the firm of its opportunity to assess whether its
interests would better be served if it were his sole source of remuneration.23
In side-benefit cases, it's tempting to rationalize the restitutionary remedy
against a disloyal agent or other fiduciary as restoring property to the principal
wrongfully taken by the agent, comparable to undoing a fiduciary's
misappropriation of assets owned by the principal. This explanation stretches
the definition of property to encompass assets, like the investment
opportunities in Phansalkar, to which the principal had no claim absent the
agent's breach of duty.24 Additionally, a fiduciary must disgorge benefits
obtained by using his or her position when the principal could not itself have
obtained the benefits, a point most vividly established in cases subjecting the
fiduciary to liability to account for bribes or other illegal payments received
from third parties. 25 The reach of the disgorgement remedy thus strains the
property metaphor to an untenable point. The remedy is better grounded in its
21 Id. at 211. More controversially, the court held that all of the banker's compensation
during the period of disloyalty could be forfeited to his employer. For a discussion of this
aspect of Phansalkar, see Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049,
1059-61 (2007).
22 Phansalkar, 344 F.3d at 203.
23 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02, cmt. b (2006) ("Although the agent may
believe that no harm will befall the principal, the agent is not in a position disinterestedly to
assess whether harm may occur or whether the principal's interests would be better served if
the agent did not pursue or acquire the benefit from the third party.").
24 For further criticism of property-based metaphors in this context, see JAMES GORDLEY,
FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 454-55 (2006) ("The dishonest fiduciary and the thug take
money for depriving plaintiff of something to which he is entitled; so does one who sells
another's property; therefore they violated a property-like right. All cats die; Socrates is
dead; therefore Socrates is a cat.").
25 See, e.g., Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 17 (N.J. 1955) (holding that city could
recover through constructive trust monies extorted by former city officials from city
employees); Hadden v. Consol. Edison Co., 312 N.E.2d 445, 447 (N.Y. 1974) (declining to
review the lower court's grant of summary judgment requiring employee to disgorge bribes
obtained); see also S.E.L. Maduro (Fla.), Inc. v. M/V Santa Lucia, 116 F.R.D. 289, 297 (D.
Mass. 1987) (allowing defendants to amend their answer to include a defense that the
contract upon which plaintiffs sought to recover was void as a matter of public policy due to
a breach of fiduciary duty in the form of illegal kickbacks).
[Vol. 91: 851
HeinOnline  -- 91 B.U. L. Rev. 856 2011
CA USA TION IN THE FID UCIAR Y REALM
functional objectives - precluding the prospect of profit through breach of
fiduciary duty and deterring breach.
26
B. Limits to Recovery
A basic limit to a fiduciary's liability to disgorge ill-gotten gain is causal -
the liability does not extend to assets acquired in a manner unrelated to the
breach of duty. Subject to that basic limit, a fiduciary's disgorgement liability
extends to consequential gains. 27 Thus, in Phansalkar, the banker's liability
extends to assets acquired via exchanging the investment opportunities
accepted from his employer's clients, beginning with shares of stock acquired
through the exercise of stock options.28 On the other hand, assets that the
banker acquired independently of the breach are not vulnerable to
disgorgement because the disgorgement remedy does not operate as a general
forfeiture of assets held by a disloyal fiduciary.
29
A further limit on disgorgement bears a strong resemblance to proximate-
cause and remoteness limits on recovery for losses that are causally linked to
an actor's tortious conduct. 30 Somewhat intuitive and imprecisely phrased, this
limit reflects a range of concerns that bear on whether the fiduciary would be
unjustly enriched unless a particular asset or profit is disgorged.3 1 For starters,
a defendant's profits may be too remotely situated from the breach because
they cannot be quantified with sufficient precision. 32 The fact that a fiduciary
26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43, cmt. b
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). Professor Gordley notes that, in many cases, fiduciaries are
required to disgorge only benefits "a principal might have obtained for himself." GORDLEY,
supra note 24, at 457. Other instances are, in his view, "at best, efforts at prophylaxis...
and at worst, overly zealous overreactions." Id.
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 53(3) (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 2007).
28 Phansalkar v. Anderson Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2003).
29 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51, cmt. e(4)
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) ("Disgorgement does not impose a general forfeiture:
defendant's liability in restitution is not the whole of the gain from a tainted transaction, but
the amount of the gain that is attributable to the underlying wrong.").
30 On the limitation more generally, see Lionel Smith, The Measurement of
Compensation Claims Against Trustees and Fiduciaries, in EXPLORING PRIVATE LAw 363,
368-69 (Elise Bant & Matthew Harding eds., 2010) ("The reason that we do not allow
recovery (in tort or contract or breach of fiduciary obligation) for all losses that are linked in
a but-for sense to the breach is that we think that this would cast the net of moral and legal
responsibility too widely."). Professor Smith acknowledges that Hart and Honord wrote
Causation in the Law around this premise. Id. at 369 n. 16.
31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. e(l)
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (acknowledging the imprecision of the remoteness standard
but justifying its use "because it summarizes in intuitive fashion a variety of concerns that
are potentially relevant to the ultimate issue of unjust enrichment").
32 Id.
2011]
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holds a particular asset or has realized particular profits may also be over-
determined; that is, multiple causes, each sufficient to explain the outcome, are
present. Over-determination can compound quantification problems when the
fiduciary's own efforts legitimately contributed to the profit. 33
To illustrate, consider the remedies potentially available to the plaintiff in
EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,34 in which the plaintiff - the creditors'
committee suing on behalf of eToys, Inc. - alleged that Goldman breached its
fiduciary duty to eToys in connection with its initial public offering (IPO).3 5
The plaintiff alleged that Goldman, engaged by eToys as its IPO underwriter,
also undertook to advise it about pricing the IP0.36 In so advising eToys,
Goldman allegedly failed to disclose the existence of arrangements with other
customers to whose accounts it allocated IPO shares in exchange for a share of
any profits the customers made when they sold the shares at a price higher than
the IPO price.37 According to the plaintiff, these arrangements gave Goldman
an incentive to underprice the IPO. 38 The court held that the complaint's
allegations of an advisory relationship, independent of the contractually-
specified underwriting relationship, sufficed to allege the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. 39 "Goldman Sachs breached this duty by allegedly
concealing from eToys its divided loyalty arising from its profit-sharing
arrangement with clients," 40 which constituted a material conflict of interest. 41
31 See id
14 832 N.E.2d 26 (N.Y. 2005).
35 Id. at 30.
36 Id.
17 Id. ("As a result of this undisclosed scheme, Goldman Sachs was allegedly paid 20%
to 40% of the clients' profits from trading the eToys securities.").
38 Id. When the underwriting agreement was finalized, eToys agreed to sell shares to
Goldman at $18.65 and Goldman agreed to offer the shares to the public at $20. Id. at 29.
On the first day of trading, eToys opened at $79, rose as high as $85, then closed for the day
at $76.56. Id. at 29-30. Shortly after the end of the year, the stock traded below $20; a
bankruptcy filing followed within two years of the IPO. Id. at 30.
31 Id. at 31 ("Essentially, according to the complaint, eToys hired Goldman Sachs to give
it advice for the benefit of the company, and Goldman Sachs thereby had a fiduciary
obligation to disclose any conflict of interest concerning the pricing of the IPO.").
41 Id. For recognition that an advisory relationship may give rise to a fiduciary
relationship, even when the parties' agreement does not specifically require advice about a
particular matter or type of transaction, see Pergament v. Roach, 838 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594
(App. Div. 2007) (finding that, in spite of the lack of a provision requiring advice on equity
financing, general provision in agreement requiring financial advisers to provide "customary
financial consulting advice as is reasonably requested" along with evidence that the advisers
had previously discussed equity financing with the client was sufficient to preclude
judgment as a matter of law that no fiduciary relationship existed between the advisers and
the client).
41 EBC L Inc., 832 N.E.2d at 32.
[Vol. 91: 851
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Intriguing though it is to wonder why the defendant would trade off a loss in
underwriting commissions - generated by underpricing the IPO - for a share in
its customers' profits, our immediate focus is the remedies potentially available
to eToys's representative. 42 First, eToys may establish that, had it known of
the profit-sharing arrangements, it would not have agreed to sell its shares in
an IPO for a lower price than the market might have borne. If so, eToys
suffered a harm that resulted from Goldman's breach of duty in failing to
disclose these arrangements. As discussed further in Part II, eToys's loss, if
quantifiable, may be recoverable. Second, if Goldman's failure to disclose its
profit-sharing agreements with customers breached its duty of loyalty to eToys
(its advisory client), payments Goldman received from customers are benefits
received "in breach of a fiduciary duty," and Goldman may have to disgorge
these payments. 43
More complicated is whether restitutionary liability might extend any
further. In general, the law of restitution measures enrichment resulting from a
payment of money by "the consequent increase in the net assets of the person
enriched." 44 When the defendant is a wrongdoer (such as a disloyal fiduciary),
the measure of unjust enrichment cannot be "less than the market value of the
benefits wrongfully obtained,"45 plus the amount representing "the net profit
attributable to the underlying wrong," if any.4 6 The underlying objective,
which is profit-stripping but not the imposition of penalties, 47 recognizes that a
defendant may legitimately make investments from funds untainted by the
breach that enhance the portion of its business implicated in the breach.48
Within this framework, might eToys succeed in claiming a share of Goldman's
profits from additional business with customers grateful for their allocations of
low-priced shares in eToys's IPO? Many factors might explain the incidence
of subsequent transactions, including strengths and attractions of Goldman as a
provider of financial services and products that are distinct from its practice of
allocating IPO shares. Although courts recognize the difficulty of measuring
gain in unjust enrichment cases and ordinarily permit a claimant to meet its
burden of proof by presenting "a coherent theory of recovery" explaining how
42 As of 2008, the parties were engaged in discovery prior to trial. See EBC I Inc., No.
601805/2002, 2008 WL 4612640 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 30, 2008) (trial order addressing
discovery costs).
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43(1)(a), (2)(a)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
44Id.
45 Id. § 51(2).
46 Id. § 51(3).
41 Id. § 49(1).
48 Id. § 51(4)(c) ("A wrongdoer may be allowed a credit for money expended in
acquiring or preserving the property or in carrying on the business that is the source of the
profit subject to disgorgement. By contrast, a wrongdoer will ordinarily be denied any
credit for direct contributions in the form of services, or for expenditures incurred directly in
the commission of a wrong to the claimant.").
2011]
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the defendant's "wrong has proximately resulted in an unjust gain to the
claimant," 49 the simple fact that the defendant's business booked profits
following a breach of fiduciary duty does not suffice as a causal link. In other
words, the fact that profits follow breach is but a "narrative of brute
sequence" 50 not a legally persuasive account of factual causation.
Separately, a disloyal fiduciary might argue that disgorgement should not
reach the full extent of post-disloyalty profit because after a point, either other
causal factors intervened or the causal force of the disloyalty otherwise came
to an end. The best illustration is SEC v. MacDonald,5 1 in which the director
of a corporation bought shares of its publicly traded stock on the basis of
favorable inside information that had yet to be publicly disclosed.52 Following
public disclosure, the price of the shares increased from $4.625, the price at
which the defendant purchased, to $5.75; 53 twelve months later, the defendant
sold at $10 per share. 54 The defendant argued, and the First Circuit agreed,
that his liability to disgorge profits should be measured by the differential
between the price at which he bought the shares and the price at which they
traded upon public disclosure of the information, and not by the larger
differential realized by the defendant when he sold the shares. 55 Moreover,
had the defendant reinvested the proceeds in another publicly traded stock
which appreciated in value by the time his conduct came to light, he would not
be liable for the gains from this subsequent investment. 56 The court reasoned
that once the market price impounded the impact of the publicly-disclosed
information, the defendant had reached "the point of his full gain from the
fraud ... .-57 Thereafter he did only what others had the right to do, which is
hold the stock he purchased and later sell it and reinvest the proceeds in
another publicly traded stock. Thus, his post-public-disclosure gains were "not
causally related to the fraud, '58 which insider trading constitutes under the
federal securities laws. More instrumentally, sellers of stock - defrauded
through the defendant's purchase informed by inside information - might
otherwise speculate at the expense of a fraudulent seller, perhaps waiting for
subsequent movements in stock price to determine what course to take.59
49 Id. cmt. e(4).
50 HART & HONORE, supra note 1, at 63.
51 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
52 Id. at 48.
53 Id. at 49-50.
54 Id. at 49.
55 Id. at 55 (reversing the lower court judgment and ordering the disgorgement figure be
based on the price of the stock a reasonable time after public disclosure).
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43, illus. 36
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (based on MacDonald).
51 MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 54.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 53 ("Once the seller has discovered the fraud, he can protect against further
[Vol. 91: 851
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It is difficult to understand the outcome in MacDonald entirely within the
confines of traditional accounts of causation. But for the defendant's purchase
on the basis of inside information, he would not have held a particular asset
that appreciated in value. The appreciation appears to be consequential gains
that followed upon his initial transgression. Nor does it appear "remote" from
the breach because nothing other than the operation of the stock market
produced it. Moreover, the defendant's gain from post-public-disclosure
appreciation stemmed solely from the fact that he continued to hold the stock,
and not from the active intervention of a distinct causal force, whether
embodied in the defendant or someone or something else.60
In deciding to hold the stock, the defendant was not, as it happens, situated
identically to public investors who bought shares following public disclosure
of the material information. The defendant in MacDonald may have continued
to hold the stock because he believed his initial purchase on the basis of inside
information would more likely elude detection the longer he delayed taking his
gains by selling. 61 If so, he traded off the risk of subsequent declines in the
trading price against the risk of detection, a tradeoff perhaps eased by his
ongoing access to non-public information available through his insider status.
damage by replacing the securities and should not be allowed to profit from a further
appreciation, while being protected against depreciation by his right to recover at least the
difference in value at the time of his sale." (quoting Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281, 1306 n.27 (2d Cir. 1973))). MacDonald remains of interest despite subsequent
legislation capping the total amount of damages imposed on a defendant who violates
prohibitions on trading on insider information or tipping others at "the profit gained or loss
avoided in the transaction or transactions that are the subject of the violation." 15 U.S.C. §
78t-1(b)(I) (2006).
60 In the conventional formulation, one causal force intervenes or supersedes another
when it is represents the "active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a
third person's innocent, tortious, or criminal act" that is a substantial factor in bringing
about a particular harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 439 (1965). More
metaphorically, an intervening cause could be characterized as "displacing the original
conduct both as an explanation of the harm and, when later conduct is in issue, as a focus of
responsibility." HART & HONORt, supra note 1, at xlviii-xlix. Metaphors, which abound in
legal formulations of causal requirements, tend to reflect common sense. See id at xlix
("The battery of metaphors found in the law in causal contexts, which at first sight seem so
bizarre, are to be explained as reflections of the common-sense idea that where the analogy
with manipulation [by the actor] is too remote the conduct cannot be regarded as causing the
harm.").
61 Two bases for this belief are sections 78p(a) and 78p(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Section 78p(a), which requires that insiders report their transactions to the
issuer, stock exchanges, and the SEC, is a well-known resource for public and private
enforcers of prohibitions against insider trading. Section 78p(b) permits the issuer or a
shareholder suing on its behalf to recover profit made or loss avoided by specific categories
of insiders - including directors - in purchase-sale or sale-purchase transactions that occur
within six-month intervals. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)-(b)
(2006).
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The defendant's eventual sale might also seem motivated by a hope of
muddying the waters sufficiently to disguise his initial insider trading. Thus,
the defendant's insider-trading transgression and the appreciation in market
value that followed public disclosure may be causally linked, not separate
phenomena as the court reasoned. Perhaps the court assumed that the
defendant's investment decision to hold the stock was comparable to a decision
to reinvest the proceeds in another publicly traded stock (for which the
defendant lacked inside information) following sale of the initial tainted
investment. If the defendant reinvests, he makes an investment decision that is
decoupled from his initial culpable decision, and if the reinvestment rises in
price, his profits likewise seem decoupled from his initial use of inside
information.
One might rethink the problem posed by the MacDonald facts as a question
of allocating burdens to prove or disprove causation - allocating to the
defendant the burden of showing that, for example, he had a preexisting
investment plan to invest in the stock that appreciated so dramatically.62 So to
allocate the burden is consistent with resolving doubts against the actor whose
conduct was wrongful 63 when the claimant is unlikely to have access to
evidence essential to satisfying the burden on causation, and when, as above,
the defendant's post-transgression conduct may be motivated in part by the
wish to conceal his wrongful conduct. On the other hand, to readers who
perceive insider trading as a lesser form of fiduciary misconduct,
depersonalized and intermediated as it is by public trading markets, it may be
attractive to limit liability as did the MacDonald court. The basis for the
limitation, though, is not the lack of but-for causal connection, but the
judgment that the defendant's unjust enrichment extends only so far, to
appreciation in the stock's market value up to the time the market price
incorporated the information on which the defendant traded.64 This is a
limitation derived from a policy or all-things-considered judgment, not
requirements of but-for causation. 65
62 Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule lOb-5: A Restitution
Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 349, 385-87 (1984) ("The defendant should
have the opportunity to prove that he would have obtained the benefit even without the
fraud - for example, that he would have purchased the stock at the higher price once full
disclosure had been made.").
63 Id at 390 ("Focusing on the defendant and resolving doubts against the party
committing the fraud is consistent with the law of restitution and with the dual
deterrent/compensatory purposes of the federal securities laws.").
64 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 1, cmt. e(l)
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) ("But 'remoteness' may also describe a judgment that the
defendant will not be unjustly enriched, notwithstanding the existence of a causal
connection, if the profit is retained.").
65 Discussing analogous issues in the law of negligence, Hart and Honord observe that
[s]uch general notions of social policy and expediency seem to lie at the root of the
rules by which courts circumscribe the harm recoverable in the tort of negligence,
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Thus, although the vocabulary of disgorging ill-gotten gain is distinctive, it
unquestionably embodies concepts of but-for causation and remoteness. To be
sure, in some instances - a trustee's disgorgement of misappropriated trust
assets, for instance - it belabors the obvious to stress the presence of causal
questions. But other instances of fiduciary disloyalty raise complex and wide-
reaching issues that are more difficult to resolve.
II. LOSSES CAUSED BY BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. The Basic Principle
Beneficiaries betrayed by their fiduciaries often seek restitutionary
remedies, 66 or interpose the breach of fiduciary duty as a defense to a suit by
the fiduciary for breach of contract, 67 or seek to avoid contracts entered into
with the fiduciary when the fiduciary has not appropriately obtained the
beneficiary's consent to a self-dealing transaction. 68  Additionally, long-
standing authority in the United States subjects a fiduciary to liability to the
beneficiary "for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the
relation,"69 which entitles the beneficiary to recover tort damages,70 including
consequential 7' and, in appropriate cases, punitive damages. 72 The availability
rather than any feeling that certain forms of harm brought about in certain ways are
"unforeseeable" or "beyond the risk" or that it is intuitively unjust or inexpedient to
make defendant pay compensation for them.
HART & HONORE, supra note 1, at 306. Determinations of unjust enrichment, in contrast,
necessarily invite consideration of what is "intuitively unjust," in contrast to recovery of
economic loss consequent upon tortiously-inflicted physical injury, which is the focus of
this passage.
66 See supra Part I.
67 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 668 (2d ed. 1993).
68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03, cmt. d (2006).
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979).
70 Id. at cmt. b. ("The remedy of a beneficiary against a defaulting or negligent trustee is
ordinarily in equity; the remedy of a principal against an agent is ordinarily at law.
However, irrespective of this, the beneficiary is entitled to tort damages for harm caused by
the breach of duty arising from the relation ....").
71 See, e.g., Widett & Widett v. Snyder, 467 N.E.2d 1312, 1317 (Mass. 1984)
(concluding mortgagor breached fiduciary duty owed to corporation as a director by using
corporation to alter mortgage executed on behalf of law firm by failing to disclose to
corporation his personal interest in assignment of mortgage; mortgagor/director subject to
liability for legal fees incurred by corporation in defending suit brought by law firm).
72 See, e.g., In re Estate of Hoellen, 854 N.E.2d 774, 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (upholding
grant of punitive damages where breach of fiduciary duty was flagrant and intentional).
Indeed, punitive damages may be an available remedy even when a jurisdiction does not
recognize breach of fiduciary duty as a distinct tort. See Kinesoft Dev. Corp. v. Softbank
Holdings, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 869, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2001). If a breach of fiduciary duty can
be remedied, and the actor's conduct was neither malicious nor fraudulent, punitive
damages may not be available. See Adams v. Coates, 626 A.2d 36, 42 (Md. 1993)
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of such tort damages does not preclude the plaintiffs additional recovery of
disgorgement from a disloyal fiduciary and other restitutionary remedies. 73
Although a fiduciary's disloyal act may harm the beneficiary, showing that
harm resulted from the disloyalty is not requisite to the restitutionary remedy
of disgorgement. 74 However, it is crucial to recovering damages in tort. This
divergence exemplifies the "dualism" of fiduciary remedies described in the
Introduction. Additionally, it further illustrates why metaphors derived from
property are inadequate to explain the remedies available in the wake of
fiduciary disloyalty.75 That is, damages that quantify harm resulting from a
breach of duty cannot plausibly be characterized as restoring to the beneficiary
assets misappropriated or otherwise taken by a disloyal fiduciary. Such
damages compensate the beneficiary and attempt to restore the beneficiary to
her position prior to the fiduciary's breach, but are not geared to recapture
benefits belonging to the beneficiary that the fiduciary appropriated through
disloyal conduct.
B. Standards for Assessing Causation
Tort law in the United States has not been consistent over time in the
vocabulary and concepts associated with causation. For present purposes,
three basic distinctions are important to considering causation in connection
with harm "resulting from" fiduciary disloyalty. First, tort law generally
distinguishes between factual cause - often referred to as but-for or sine qua
non causation - and proximate cause (also termed scope of liability). 76 An
actor's conduct is a factual cause of an outcome "if, in the absence of the act,
the outcome would not have occurred. '77 In contrast, determinations of
proximate cause or scope of liability presuppose that an actor's conduct
constituted a factual cause of an injurious outcome, but nonetheless consider
(upholding denial of punitive damages after trial court found partner acted without fraud or
malice).
73 For a well-known instance in which a principal recovered a secret side-payment
received by his former agent in connection with the principal's purchase of a business from
sellers who made the side-payments, plus expenses incurred in suing the sellers to effect
rescission of the purchase, plus the costs of operating the business prior to the rescission, see
Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 802 (Minn. 1952), discussed at greater length in
Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and
Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 925, 929-30 (2006).
74 See Nichols v. Minnick, 885 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 2008) (stating that disgorgement is an
appropriate remedy even where plaintiff "has suffered no demonstrable harm"). For the
substantive point that an agent's loan to an adverse party may breach the agent's duty of
loyalty to the principal unless the principal consents to the loan, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 8.03 cmt. c, illus. 4 (2006).
71 See supra Part I.A.
76 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26, cmt. a
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
77 Id. at cmt. b.
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whether the actor should be subject to legal responsibility.78 Second, an
actor's conduct might constitute "a" factual cause of an injurious outcome but
not the sole or "the" cause.79 Nonetheless, why should the fortuity of another
cause - for example, another tortfeasor - exculpate an actor from the legal
consequences of tortious conduct?80 One solution is simply to acknowledge
that each of several multiple acts may be a factual cause of a harm; an
alternative solution treats a causal sequence as a factual cause of a harm when
it constituted a "substantial factor" in causing the harm.8 1
Third, and finally, courts historically applied a less demanding analysis of
causation when the plaintiff alleged injury inflicted by an intentional tort than
in cases alleging negligent infliction of physical injury. In particular, in
common law fraud cases, 82 discussed more fully in Part III, courts only rarely
addressed questions of proximate cause and usually determined factual cause
by whether the plaintiff proved reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation, 83
so long as the plaintiffs reliance was a "substantial factor in determining the
course of conduct that result[ed] in his lOSS. ' ' 84 In contrast with negligently
inflicted physical injury, harm resulting from fraud is likely to be closely
linked to the fraud.85 Additionally, fraudfeasors, like other actors who commit
intentional torts, are morally blameworthy to a greater degree than are careless
or hapless tortfeasors, and deterring fraud, like other intentional torts, does not
seem likely to become socially inefficient.86 For a victim of fraud, reliance on
a fraudulent misrepresentation sufficed to establish factual cause under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, although "his reliance on the truth of the
fraudulent misrepresentation [was not] the sole or even the predominant or
78 Id. § 29 (limiting liability for physical harm to those "that result from the risks that
made the actor's conduct tortious").
79 Id. § 27.
81 Id. at cmt. c. To be sure, many tortious acts occur that do not cause harm, but in "our
common understanding of causation" multiple sufficient causes are causes in fact of harm,
regardless of the but-for standard. Id.
81 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-432 (1965). In contrast, Restatement
(Third) of Torts jettisons the "substantial factor" terminology as confusing. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26, cmt. j (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("The substantial factor test has not, however, withstood the test of
time, as it has proved confusing and been misused.").
82 See infra Part III.
83 For a fuller discussion, see Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal
Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REv. 811, 832-33 (2009).
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 546 (1977). The Restatement (Third) project has
yet to address fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
85 Fisch, supra note 83, at 832 ("[T]he requirement in negligence cases that the plaintiff's
harm be an expectable or foreseeable consequence of the defendant's actions does not apply
to intentional torts.").
86 Id. at 832-33.
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decisive factor in influencing his conduct." 87  Moreover, "[i]t is not even
necessary that he would not have acted or refrained from acting as he did
unless he had relied on the misrepresentation. 88
C. Factual Cause and Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Courts do not use the same standard to determine factual cause when a
beneficiary seeks compensatory damages for harm allegedly resulting from a
fiduciary's disloyalty. While some cases use the "substantial factor" standard
applicable to common law fraud, other cases require that the beneficiary
establish that, but for the disloyalty, the harm would not have occurred.
Although common law fraud both resembles and differs from fiduciary
disloyalty, the "substantial factor" standard is preferable to stringent
application of a "but for" standard. The substantial factor standard better
advances the objective of accountability by fiduciaries that should animate the
formulation of remedial doctrine in this context. If fiduciary doctrine properly
embodies deterrent and prophylactic goals (as it does), the standard for factual
cause should not undermine these goals, just as a more exacting standard in
common law fraud cases, by reducing or eliminating the remedial
consequences of fraud for its perpetrators, would undermine the objectives that
underlie the tort. Alternatively, a court might consider whether fiduciary
disloyalty might warrant shifting burdens on causation to the fiduciary in some
instances.
In the leading case, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon,89 a law
firm represented its client's former agent, without the long-standing client's
consent, in the acquisition of a business opportunity also sought by the long-
standing client.90 Applying New York law, the Second Circuit held that it
sufficed for causation for the long-standing client to establish that the law
firm's representation of the former agent was "at least a substantial factor" that
prevented her from acquiring the business assets.91 It was neither necessary
nor feasible for the court to determine that the long-standing client would have
completed the transaction had her law firm not represented her former agent in
the matter.92 In a prior case, ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.,93
87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 546, cmt. b (1977). For further discussion of
reliance and factual causation in this context, see John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARiz. L. REv. 1001 (2006).
88 Id. "Thus it is immaterial that he is influenced by other considerations, such as similar
misrepresentations from third persons, if he is also substantially influenced by the
misrepresentation in question." Id.
89 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994).
i ld. at 539-42.
91 Id. at 543.
92 Id. at 544 ("We need not and cannot determine whether or not Mrs. Leo would have
successfully completed the transaction without Milbank's conduct against her interests.").
93 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
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the former business manager of then-former Beatle, George Harrison, breached
his fiduciary duty by passing confidential information to the plaintiff in a
copyright infringement suit, followed by Harrison's failure to settle the
infringement suit. The former manager then acquired rights to the infringed
work. The Second Circuit rejected the argument that an actionable breach of
fiduciary duty requires a finding that the breach was "the proximate cause of
injury to the principal. ' 94 No "'but for' relationship" was necessary to link the
manager's disloyalty to the failed settlement because "[a]n action for breach of
fiduciary duty is a prophylactic rule intended to remove all incentive to
breach. '95 However, recent cases require that the fiduciary's disloyalty be a
substantial factor in the harm suffered by the beneficiary 96 or a "real factor in
bringing about" injuries. 97
Other courts and jurisdictions require a beneficiary who seeks compensation
for loss from a disloyal fiduciary to establish that, but for the breach, the loss
would not have occurred. In several recent cases in which the court required
but-for causation, the alleged breach of fiduciary duty is that of a lawyer or law
firm and arises from facts also alleged to constitute legal malpractice. 98 In
these cases, courts may be concerned not to undercut the stringent
requirements for success in legal malpractice litigation.99 Other cases, not
involving claims of legal malpractice, require a but-for showing of causation to
recover for harm allegedly stemming from fiduciary disloyalty more
generally. 100 In all cases, the causal standard seems a function of the remedy
94 Id. at 995. In ABKCO, the injury was the failure of negotiations to resolve the
underlying copyright infiingement suit. Id.
91 Id. at 995-96.
96 See Tethys Bioscience, Inc. v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., No.
C 09-5115 CW, 2010 WL 2287474, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2010) (including "damage
proximately caused by the breach" as an element of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
under California law (quoting Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 776 (Ct. App.
1995))).
97 See Feinberg v. Eckelmeyer, No. 2:09-cv-1536-WY, 2009 WL 4906376, at *10 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 16, 2009) (quoting McDermott v. Party City Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 612, 626 n.18
(E.D. Pa. 1998)).
98 See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gardere & Wynne, L.L.P., 82 F. App'x 116, 117
(5th Cir. 2003); Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Buch v. Holliday,
803 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Ulico Cas. Co. v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz,
Edelman & Dicker, 865 N.Y.S.2d 14, 18-19 (App. Div. 2008); Weil, Gotshal & Manges,
LLP v. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 780 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (App. Div. 2004).
99 See Carmel v. Lunney, 505 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (App. Div. 1986) (finding that although
criminal defendant's lawyers had an undisclosed conflict interest because they represented
others under investigation in the same incident, the client's guilty plea precluded his ability
to establish his lawyers' breach of fiduciary duty as the proximate cause of his damages).
'oo See LNC Invs., Inc. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 173 F.3d 454, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1999);
Sheehy v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 690 F. Supp. 2d 51, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (requiring
both "but-for" and proximate cause to prevail on a claim of breach of fiduciary duty).
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sought by the beneficiary, because restitutionary remedies - including
forfeiture of fees otherwise due a disloyal lawyer - escape the stringency of
"but-for" causation.10'
Requiring the beneficiary to show sine qua non causation may too sharply
delineate or dissociate disloyalty from flawed performance. Although
disloyalty's consequences may be evident, disloyalty may also work more
subtly to diminish the quality of work or to blind the fiduciary to the demands
of loyal service.102 Thus, looser causal requirements may be appropriate,
especially when the beneficiary's ability to prove but-for causation is limited
by the nature of the relationship with the fiduciary. This is especially likely to
be so when the fiduciary's role requires the exercise of substantial discretion.
To be sure, once the beneficiary and the court know that the fiduciary breached
a duty of loyalty, for example by continuing to act on behalf of the beneficiary
without obtaining the beneficiary's consent to the fiduciary's representation of
an adverse party, the lens through which the fiduciary's performance is viewed
becomes clouded by knowledge of the fiduciary's conflict or adverse position,
which may seem in retrospect to have been causally more significant than it
would have appeared if examined contemporaneously.10 3 But perhaps this risk
is appropriately borne by the fiduciary, who, after all, undertook to act loyally
on the beneficiary's behalf and then chose to act disloyally. At a minimum,
perhaps the burden of proof - if but-for causation is the applicable standard -
should fall on the fiduciary, not the beneficiary.
To be sure, in some cases - as in Boon - the beneficiary's claims against the
fiduciary go well beyond mere flaws in performance arguably induced by the
fiduciary's disloyalty because the fiduciary's acts themselves are evidently and
directly contrary to the beneficiary's interests. In such cases, the beneficiary
may readily show but-for causation. For example, suppose the fiduciary's
breach consists of deceitful statements made to the beneficiary that allay the
beneficiary's concerns about proceeding with a transaction. 10 4 On such facts,
'o' See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 82 F. App'x at 118; LNCInvs., Inc., 173 F.3d at 465; Am.
Fed. Grp., Ltd. v. Rothenberg, 136 F.3d 897, 980 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998); Hendry, 73 F.3d at
402.
102 See Estate of Re v. Kornstein Veisz & Wexler, 958 F. Supp. 907, 925 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) ("The unique nature of the attorney client relationship requires that attorneys be
sensitive not only to obvious conflicts, but also to forces that might operate upon them
subtly in a manner likely to diminish the quality of their work."). Commenting on the
defendants, lawyers who did not disclose a material conflict to their client, the court noted:
"In light of the factual record in this matter, it is possible that defendants were not
adequately attuned to certain economic forces operating upon them, and that they were not
sufficiently forthright in revealing these forces" to their client. Id. at 926.
103 See, e.g., id. at 927-28 ("Viewed through the lens of a potential conflict of interest,
defendants' otherwise defensible tactical decisions take on a more troubling gloss, and
suggest at the least the possibility that defendants' divided loyalties substantially contributed
to [their client's] defeat at arbitration [in which the defendants represented him].").
104 For a recent example, in which a plaintiff was allegedly induced into proceeding with
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the fiduciary's misconduct may have sufficient causal force, independent of
other possible causes, to satisfy a but-for standard of causation. Nonetheless,
the objectives of fiduciary accountability range more widely than
compensating beneficiaries who have been defrauded by their fiduciary or
otherwise victimized by .conduct that would be tortious even when committed
by a non-fiduciary actor. These wider objectives require a more nuanced
approach to factual causation.
III. CAUSATION IN A BROADER FRAMEwORK
In some respects fiduciary disloyalty resembles the tort of common law
fraud, with implications for the applicable standards of causation. In
particular, many disloyal fiduciaries are, like fraudfeasors, dishonest and
calculating when breaching a duty in a quest for personal gain.10 5
Additionally, both the common law of fraud and fiduciary duty create rights
that have absolute qualities that are not lessened by the victim's own conduct.
Thus, fiduciary duty confers on the beneficiary the right to rely on the
fiduciary's loyalty because creating such a right is the point of forming a
fiduciary relationship. The beneficiary's rights against the fiduciary are not
lessened because the beneficiary did not monitor the fiduciary's conduct as a
self-help measure to detect instances of disloyalty because the point of
imposing fiduciary duties is to entitle the beneficiary to trust the fiduciary. By
analogy, the beneficiary is like the client of an auditor; the client's negligent
failure to detect employee defalcations does not furnish a defense to the auditor
if it, likewise, negligently fails to detect the same misconduct. 10 6 Likewise, a
victim's contributory negligence is not a defense to intentional fraud. 10 7
a real estate transaction by the false statements of her attorney, see Sheehy, 690 F. Supp. 2d
at 65.
105 See Andrew Burrows, Remedial Coherence and Punitive Damages in Equity, in
EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 381, 397 (Simone Degeling & James Edelman eds., 2005)
("[T]here is a close analogy between dishonestly committed torts, such as deceit, and the
type of dishonestly committed breach of fiduciary duty in this case. Both concern the
dishonestly committed breach of an imposed duty and, as in many typical cases triggering
punitive damages, the defendants had cynically committed the breach of fiduciary duty in
order to reap a profit."). Although I agree with Professor Burrows that fiduciary duties are
"imposed," which I understand to mean imposed by law, their underlying source is beyond
the scope of this Article.
106 See Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (App. Div. 1939) ("We are...
not prepared to admit that accountants are immune from the consequences of their
negligence because those who employ them have conducted their own business
negligently.").
107 As explained below, most courts require that a claimant establish reliance in fact on
the false representation and that the reliance was justifiable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 537 (1977) ("The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation can recover against its
maker for pecuniary loss resulting from it if, but only if, he relies on the misrepresentation
in acting or refraining from action, and his reliance is justifiable."). Justifiable reliance
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On the other hand, fiduciary disloyalty is in many ways less complex than
common law fraud. For starters, the motives and knowledge of the disloyal
fiduciary are not elements of the beneficiary's claim. In contrast, a
misrepresentation of a matter of fact, opinion, or law is not fraudulent unless
the maker "knows or believes that the matter is not as stated, or that he lacks
"the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies,"
or that he "knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he
states or implies. ' 10 8 Additionally, although many acts of fiduciary disloyalty
are deceitful, others are not.
More significantly from the standpoint of causation, the elements of
common law fraud include a reliance requirement that is distinct from the
requirement that the victim's reliance has been "a substantial factor in
determining the course of conduct that results in his loss."109 That is, one who
makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability only for "pecuniary
loss suffered by one who justifiably relies upon the truth of the matter
misrepresented" and the "reliance is a substantial factor in determining the
course of conduct that results" in the loss.110 Professor Goldberg and his co-
authors argue that the point of the separate reliance requirement is the
relational character of fraud as a tort.1 1  In their account, "fraud is built on a
relational directive requiring one to refrain from deceiving another to his or her
detriment by intentionally making a misstatement."'1 2 Victim reliance, in
short, completes the tort, connecting the intentional maker of a false statement
to a victim with whose decision-making the misstatement interfered.1 13
Although a fiduciary's disloyalty may result in the beneficiary's decision to
engage in a transaction - for example, if the fiduciary does not disclose a
conflict that may bias its advice to proceed with a transaction - fiduciary
disloyalty encompasses a broader range of misconduct and its consequences
than does common law fraud. A fiduciary's disloyalty did not affect the
beneficiaries in Boon and Phansalkar by inducing them to make decisions they
requires that the matter misrepresented be material, defined alternatively by whether "a
reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question" or "the maker of the misrepresentation
knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as
important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so
regard it." Id. §538. If a claimant meets either of these definitions of "justifiable" reliance,
there's not much space left in which contributory negligence might operate. See id. § 545A
("One who justifiably relies upon a fraudulent misrepresentation is not barred from recovery
by his contributory negligence in doing so.").
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977).
109 Id. § 546.
110 Id.
"I See Goldberg, Sebok & Zipursky, supra note 87, at 1011 ("Reliance is what renders
fraud a relational wrong and hence a tort.").
112 Id.
113 See id
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would not have made otherwise. The breach in Boon consisted of
unconsented-to representation of a party with directly adverse interests and, in
Phansalkar, of accepting side benefits from the principal's clients whose
transactions the recipient facilitated. Nonetheless, fiduciary disloyalty, like
fraud, is a form of relational wrongdoing; the relevant relationship is created
when the fiduciary becomes subject to a duty of loyalty to the beneficiary.
CONCLUSION
Causation in the fiduciary realm is far from a narrative of brute sequence,
whether the beneficiary seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains from a disloyal
fiduciary or seeks compensation for harm inflicted by the disloyalty. In both
instances, standards to assess causal connections should reflect the underlying
objective of imposing liability for fiduciary disloyalty. This objective is to
encourage the formation of relationships that have both intrinsic and socially
instrumental value by furnishing legally binding assurances that fiduciaries
will serve the interests of their beneficiaries in loyal fashion.'1 14
114 Matthew Harding, Manifesting Trust, 29 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 245, 264 (2009).
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